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Symposium
Introduction: Genuine Tort Reform
Carl T. Bogus*
I am not sure who coined the term "tort reform," but as far as
I know it was first used in 1974 in a student article published by
the UCLA Law Review. 1 That article was very much a Sixties
piece. The author praised Justice Roger Traynor and the
California Supreme Court for their leadership in "placing tort
liability on the party who is best able to spread the risk of loss."
She continued:
Though judicial activism is generally regarded by
traditional legal process scholars as undesirable, in tort
law, it appears to be an appropriate fulfillment of the
historical function of the common law-to meld the
precedents of the past and needs and concerns of the
present. 2
For nearly a decade thereafter, "tort reform" was still
occasionally used to refer to efforts to make the tort system more
dynamic by making it easier for victims to hold accountable
wrongdoers and those who were in a position to prevent harm.
3
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law.
1. Dian Dickson Ogilvie, Comment, Judicial Activism in Tort Reform:
The Guest Statute Exemplar and a Proposal for Comparative Negligence, 21
UCLA L. REV. 1566 (1974).
2. Id. at 1566.
3. See, e.g., Mark D. Seltzer, Comment, Personal Injury Hazardous
Waste Litigation: A Proposal for Tort Reform, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 797
(1983).
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Times, however, were changing. The modern conservative
movement was gaining force. That movement was repelled by
what it considered judicial activism. The movement's original
target was the Warren Court and its constitutional innovations in
civil rights, voting rights, and criminal procedure. In 1968,
Richard M. Nixon campaigned for the presidency on a promise to
appoint "law and order" judges, by which he meant judges who
would stop enlarging protections for criminal defendants.
Conservatives felt that an era of permissiveness had frayed the
social fabric. Stability was breaking down.
Before long conservatives began seeing tort reforms-
especially the advent of strict liability for defective and
unreasonably dangerous products-as part and parcel of the same
phenomenon. That is, they increasingly saw courts as anti-order,
anti-establishment, anti-free enterprise. In 1971, Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., who was then a corporate lawyer, wrote a memorandum for
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in which he famously said "the
American free enterprise system is under broad attack. '4 Powell
lumped together "Communists, New Leftists, and other
revolutionaries" with the American Civil Liberties Union and
Ralph Nader, whom Powell called "[p]erhaps the single most
effective antagonist of American business."5 Powell urged that the
Chamber of Commerce lead a political and social counterassault.
He wanted the counterassault launched in the venues where
public opinion is molded-college campuses, graduate schools,
secondary schools, textbooks, television and radio, scholarly
journals, newspapers and popular magazines-as well as in all
branches of government. Powell wanted the Chamber and its
allies to focus particularly on the courts. Powell was not arguing
against an activist judiciary; he was arguing for a pro-business
activist judiciary. "Under our constitutional system," he wrote,
"especially with an activist-minded Supreme Court, the judiciary
may be the most important instrument for social, economic, and
4. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Confidential Memorandum: Attack on American
Free Enterprise System, To Eugene B. Syndor, Jr., Chairman, Education
Committee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971) available at
http://reclaimdemocracy.org/corporate-accountability/powell memolewis.ht
ml (hereinafter Powell Memorandum). See also Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme
Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38 (discussing importance of
Powell's memorandum).
5. Powell Memorandum, supra note 4.
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political change." Powell continued: "This is a vast area of
opportunity for the Chamber, if it is willing to undertake the role
of spokesman for American business and if, in turn, business is
willing to provide the funds."6
Powell saw his vision realized more quickly and effectively
than he could have imagined. The Chamber led the assault that
Powell envisioned, helping to develop a powerful infrastructure of
trade association and advocacy groups. The Business Roundtable
was founded in 1972, 7 the Heritage Institute in 1973,8 the Cato
Institute in 1977,9 the Washington Legal Foundation in 1978,10
the Manhattan Institute in 1980,11 and the American Tort Reform
Association (ATRA) in 1986,12 to name only the most prominent
groups dedicated to protecting business from governmental
regulation generally and from the civil justice system specifically.
Moreover, only two months after Powell wrote his famous
memorandum, President Nixon nominated him to a seat on the
United States Supreme Court. Powell's elevation to the Court was
the beginning of a long conversion of the Court from protector of
citizen rights to hold big business accountable to protector of
business from citizen lawsuits. 13
Today "tort reform" means the opposite of what it meant a
quarter of a century ago. Notwithstanding the progressive sound
of the word reform, the phrase tort reform now stands for a
collection of regressive proposals designed to shield big business
and medicine from citizen lawsuits. It has been enormously
successful. ATRA is able to boast that "85 percent of Americans
believe too many frivolous lawsuits clog our courts," and "more
6. Id.
7. About the Business Roundtable, http://www.businessroundtable.org/a
boutUs/history.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
8. About the Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/about/ (last
visited Mar. 21, 2008).
9. About CATO, http://www.cato.org/about.php (last visited Mar. 21,
2008).
10. Washington Legal Foundation Mission, http://www.wlf.org/Resources/
WLFMissionl (last visited March 21, 2008).
11. Manhattan Forums (Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, New
York N.Y.), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/mi-five.pdf
(last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
12. About the American Tort Reform Association, http://www.atra.org/a
bout/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
13. See Rosen, supra note 4.
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than 45 states have enacted portions of ATRA's legislative
agenda."'14 Those two facts are directly related. Powell's strategy
of simultaneously waging a two-front war--one in the branches of
government and the other in the media, on the newsstands, and in
universities and think tanks-worked. ATRA achieved successes
in legislatures and the courts because it and its allies worked at
shaping public opinion. Meanwhile, for too long the principal
defender of the civil justice system, the American Association of
Justice, directed its efforts principally at lobbying the political
branches of government and litigating in the courts and largely
neglected the public relations war.15 As a result, AAJ was like the
boy with its thumb in the dike. It was able to succeed for a while
but with the waters of adverse public opinion rising constantly, its
position became increasingly untenable.
The public today believes that citizen litigation is expanding
and that the courts are filled with frivolous lawsuits-
notwithstanding that the data prove otherwise. 16  The
conventional wisdom, however, affects not only voters, but
legislators, judges, and juries. Champions of civil justice are
increasingly defeated in all forums. At least twenty-five states
have capped non-economic damages. 17 Thirty-four states have
capped punitive damages. I8 The United States Supreme Court
has also effectively imposed a constitutional cap on punitive
14. ATRA, "A Track Record of Success," available at http://www.atra.org/
about/ (last visited March 27, 2008). For additional polling data about public
attitudes toward the torts and civil justice systems, see WILLIAM HALTOM &
MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION
CRISES 267-68 (2004).
15. During the period of time when public relations was neglected, the
American Association of Justice (AAJ) was named the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America, but for simplicity's sake I refer to organization
throughout as AAJ. For the history of how AAJ neglected the public relations
war, see HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 15, at 122-27 (2004).
16. See generally CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA:
DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS AND THE COMMON LAW (2001); JAY M.
FEINMAN, UN-MAKING LAW: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN To ROLL BACK THE
COMMON LAW (2004); and HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 15.
17. See Joseph Sanders, Reforming General Damages: A Good Tort
Reform, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73, 132 (2008).
18. Scott S. Evans, Note, Dynamic Incentives: Improving the Safety,
Effectivity, and Availability of Medical Products through Progressively
Increasing Damage Caps for Manufacturers, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1069, 1081
(2007).
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damages by declaring that punitive awards are constitutionally
suspect if they are more than four times compensatory damages
and that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages . . . will satisfy due
process." 19  Taking advantage of hysteria over rising medical
malpractice premiums, in the first half of 2005 alone the heath
care industries persuaded thirty-one state legislatures to enact
some form of medical malpractice tort reform. 20 A majority of
states have also enacted tort reform measures regarding joint and
several liability and the collateral source rule.21 At the federal
level, Congress has enacted a panoply of statutes designed to
protect particular industries-including gun manufacturers and
an industry of special importance to national welfare, namely, the
cruise ship industry-from lawsuits. 22
The success of the tort reform movement is unfortunate. The
common law plays an important role in protecting public health
and safety. Lawsuits shine light into dark corners, exposing
corporate wrongdoing or shortcuts that have placed citizens at
19. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
What about a case such as Westbrook Pegler's deliberate attempt to destroy
the reputation of the writer Quentin Reynolds by telling outrageous lies
about him in Pegler's syndicated column that was published in 186
newspapers? The maliciousness was proved, but compensatory damages
were difficult to establish because magazines continued to publish Reynolds
work and his income did not decline. The jury awarded one dollar in
compensatory damages and $175,000 in punitive damages - that's more than
$1.3 million in 2007 dollars - an award that, I submit, most observers would
consider fair and just? Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1954),
aff'd, 223 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955). The case
became famous from the riveting account in Louis NIZER, MY LIFE IN COURT
17-152 (1961). Cases in which affluent defendants maliciously or recklessly
put people at grave risk but thankfully caused little injury may not be
exceedingly rare. Although the Supreme Court arguably has left room for
such cases, few judges are likely to let awards with a punitive to
compensatory ratio exceeding nine to one stand.
20. Edward J. Kionka, Things To Do (or Not) To Address the Medical
Malpractice Insurance Problem, 26 N. ILL. L. REV. 469, 479 (2006).
21. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 859-62 (2d. ed. 1992).
22. See Terry Carter, Piecemeal Tort Reform, A.B.A.J., Dec. 2001, at 50
(regarding statutes protecting particular industries generally), id. at 53
(regarding cruise ship industry). The legislation protecting firearm
manufacturers, distributors, and dealers from litigation is the Protection of
Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7901 (2006).
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risk. Indeed, it may be the exposure function that matters most,
even more than the money judgments. But of course money
matters too, providing incentives for business and health care
providers to find ways to reduce injuries. Examples abound.
Evidence shows that products liability has played a significant
role in reducing the automobile fatality rate by 79 percent since
the adoption of strict liability and the crashworthiness doctrine. 23
Escalating medical malpractice premiums provided the incentive
that caused the health care and insurance industries to team up,
analyze why there were so many anesthesia-related fatalities, and
find ways to make anesthesia safer-indeed, making a twenty-fold
improvement in the anesthesia mortality rate.24  Moreover,
contrary to popular opinion, the tort system is cost effective: the
best evidence is that the "tort tax" -how much of the retail price
we pay for products covers litigation costs-is on average 0.21
percent and the "malpractice tax" is between one and two percent
of health care expenses. 25 Although more research must be
undertaken to provide conclusive evidence, the best data available
now suggest that there is an inverse relationship between
malpractice risk and injuries due to medical negligence, that is,
the stronger the medical malpractice litigation system the safer
the health care system. 26
There is a great need for more research by scholars who are
interested in improving the tort system. It is in this spirit that we
organized this symposium. The Roscoe Pound Foundation made a
generous grant that made it possible for us to bring together some
of the nation's most prominent and respected legal scholars. We
asked the symposium participants to each make one proposal for
improving the tort system. We did not define what we meant by
"improving" the system, and we did not place any parameters on
what they might suggest. We call this project a Symposium for
Genuine Tort Reform to distinguish it from efforts with the
23. See BOGUS, supra note 16 at 138-72 (arguing that products liability
played a major role in the reduction of automobile fatalities).
24. See TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 108-110 (2005);
and David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality
in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the
Solution, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 917-23 (2005).
25. See respectively BOGUS, supra note 16 at 218-18 (regarding tort tax)
and BAKER, supra note 24 at 40 (regarding malpractice tax).
26. Hyman & Silver, supra note 24 at 915-16.
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objective of curtailing the civil justice system. Our participants
have not disappointed; they have provided thoughtful and
provocative proposals and insights.
